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INTRODUCTION
In a classroom in Argentina, two groups of students sit in gentle
debate with each other over the use of a single word: “American.” The first
group consists of local students from the Universidad de Buenos Aires, the
second is a group of students from various regions of the United States who
*
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came to study in Argentina for a brief four months. There is a period of backand-forth between the groups, in which many of the Argentine students voice
their frustration over the fact that people from the United States refer to
themselves as “Americans,” as if people from Latin America cannot hold that
title, as well.
For a handful of the U.S. students, the Argentines’ frustration comes
as a surprise. One student responds in guarded defense of the word,
explaining that in English, there really is no other word to use. The English
language does not have an adjective other than “American,” at least in
popular use, to describe “one born in the United States.” In Spanish, there is
such a word, “estadounidense.” Still, the larger issue is the word’s
connotation: that United States Americans are somehow entitled to the term;
that they are the only “Americans” worthy of the title.
One Argentine student expresses that her father holds deeper feelings
about the issue than she personally felt. Her father spoke English as a second
language and therefore often watched U.S. and European news programs that
use “America(n)” to exclusively address the United States and its people. The
student said that the use of the word in that way deeply troubled her father,
but it did not affect her in quite the same way. She felt it was just another
demonstration of the prominence of U.S. culture in the world landscape,
which she considered somewhat justified or, at the very least, expected.
A few years prior to the students’ classroom debate, a U.S. film
studio had to wrestle with the dynamics of this thorny word. In 2011,
“Capitán América: El Primer Vengador” (“Captain America: The First
Avenger”) appeared in theaters across Latin America.1 Sold-out theaters
showcased the red, white, and blue superhero saving the world in his starspangled suit, complete with a large “A” on the hero’s mask. The character
is a brave young man from humble beginnings-turned superhero, and the
physical embodiment of what a film studio in California believes it looks like
to be a hero of “American” proportions.
Before releasing “Captain America: The First Avenger” in 2011, the
studio offered to distribute the movie in foreign territories as simply “The
First Avenger,” out of fears that the international community would not take
well to the “Captain America” name.2 Only South Korea, Ukraine, and
Russia took the studio up on its offer.3
Much to the studio’s surprise, the first “Captain America” film’s
international sales exceeded domestic sales.4 Perhaps even more perplexing,
the film did “especially well in Latin America,”5 with $57 million of the $194
1. Pamela McClintock, Box Office Shocker: ‘Captain America” Earns More
Overseas Than In U.S., HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.
hollywoodreporter.com/news/box-office-shocker-captain-america-235464.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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million total gross foreign sales stemming from Latin American markets.6
The success of the Captain America franchise in Latin America demonstrates
the rising tension between local cultural values and cultural consumption as
foreign developing markets continue to import cultural goods from the
Western world in substantial numbers. This Note seeks to identify some of
the root causes of the increased importation of Western media goods to Latin
America, specifically the effect of an international copyright treaty which
transformed the landscape of trade in cultural goods.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”) is a landmark international treaty which set baseline
standards for intellectual property right (IPR) protections across the globe.
Now, more than twenty years after its promulgation, the effects of TRIPS
have led to a decrease in domestic production of copyright-based products in
several developing countries around the world. This Note will specifically
consider Latin American countries that find themselves increasingly
dependent upon imports of foreign cultural products. Though the post-TRIPS
experiences of Latin American countries are not entirely unique to the region,
other features like geographic, cultural, and lingual proximity position Latin
America to be a global competitor in the world marketplace for cultural
goods.
This Note will discuss the cultural implications of TRIPS-mandated
copyright structures on developing countries in Latin America and suggest
implementation of co-production schemes across the region which will
capitalize on Latin American countries’ particular strengths in common
language and cultural proximity. Part I will discuss the terms of TRIPS itself,
and shed light on how it changed the landscape of trade in cultural goods
around the world. In turn, Part II will demonstrate how TRIPS contributes to
the homogenization of cultural goods consumption by making it increasingly
expensive for developing countries to compete on the world market, thereby
creating an economically inefficient model for trade, and rendering
developing markets net importers of cultural goods by a wide margin.
Finally, Part III will recommend a cross-border solution through which Latin
America can capitalize on its resources through co-production agreements
with other countries, consequently fostering greater cultural output from the
region within the parameters of TRIPS.7

6. Id.; Captain America Total Grosses, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxoffice
mojo.com/franchises/chart/?id=captainamerica.htm (last updated June 14, 2017).
7. This Note will not address other IPRs implicated through TRIPS, such as patent
law and the effects of TRIPS on access to health. While this Note will examine Latin
American countries in particular, it will also touch on themes that are applicable to other
developing countries. The term “cultural goods” is meant to implicate the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”) definition, which captures the core copyright industries.
“Cultural services” represent the flow of service-based payments, including royalties and
other fees, associated with the transaction of cultural goods.
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TRIPS TRANSFORMS THE WORLD MARKETPLACE

Western producers of copyrighted materials have long sought
meaningful international protection for their intellectual wares. However, the
promulgation of TRIPS ushered in an entirely new era of global trade in
intellectual property-based goods. In attempts to speak to the drastic change
in international protection and enforcement which emerged from the
landmark treaty, this Part will first discuss the events, agreements, and
negotiations leading up to its passing during the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in 1994. Second, this
Part will examine the TRIPS provisions which at least partly supported the
robust injection of Western cultural goods to the developing world. Finally,
this Part will discuss the methods employed by Latin American countries at
the turn of the century in implementing the TRIPS obligations.
A.

The TRIPS Origin Story

International copyright protection is hardly a novel concept, but the
reach of modern enforcement mechanisms is a relatively new development.
The French pioneered the first campaign toward a universal copyright law in
the mid-nineteenth century.8 At that time, copyright law generally protected
a few categories of writings such as books, charts, and maps.9 Early
international copyright treaties emerged as bilateral agreements between two
countries through which one country guaranteed copyright protection for the
other’s goods within its borders.10 Unfortunately, these bilateral treaties did
not have the reach needed to properly protect against infringements in the
burgeoning, and interwoven, European marketplace.11 The heightening need
to expand international copyright protection eventually culminated in the
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“the Berne
Convention” or “the Convention”), which became the first truly international
treaty on copyright.12
In September of 1883, delegates met in Berne, Switzerland, and
ultimately produced ten articles relating to the international regulation of
copyrighted goods.13 Ten countries initially ratified the Berne Convention:
Belgium, France, Germany, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia
and the United Kingdom.14 While this number is scarce in today’s terms,
many of the aforementioned countries held colonies around the world which

8. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES,
LAW, AND PRACTICE 34 (3d ed. 2013).
9. Id. at 32.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 34.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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also were bound by the Berne Convention’s provisions.15 Therefore, the
Convention enjoyed wide reach and marked a monumental shift in copyright
protection on a global scale.16 Notably absent from the initial list of ratifying
countries, however, is the United States, which did not become a signatory
for another one hundred years.17
The implementation of the Berne Convention on December 5,
1887,18 had two primary implications for the future of global copyright
recognition and enforcement.19 First, the Berne Convention provided a series
of minimum rights for “authors” of copyrighted works, effectively setting an
“international floor for the scope of copyright protection.”20 At the outset, the
Berne Convention expressly guaranteed two rights: the translation right and
the public performance right.21 The protection of these rights provided
authors recourse against another who, without authorization, reproduced
(“translated”) or performed publicly the author’s work.22 Many member
states already protected the translation and public performance rights through
substantive law or in bilateral treaties with other countries; thus the Berne
Convention did not vastly change the landscape of copyright protection in
regards to the protection offered to authors of member states within in their
domestic borders.23 However, the Convention’s permanence and reach
rendered it a distinct piece of international legislation.24
The Berne Convention’s second, and more significant, implication
was its application of “national treatment” of copyrighted goods originating
in and exported to Berne Convention states.25 Under the requirement of
national treatment, any work originating in a Berne member country must be
afforded the same rights and protections as that country provides for its own
nationals.26 Essentially, a Berne member state cannot extend privileges to its
domestic authors to the exclusion or detriment of foreign author-citizens of
another Berne member state.27
In effect, the interaction of the Berne Convention’s two principal
implications creates a blanket scheme of copyright regulation in which each
Berne nation must play by the same rules: (1) all countries must adopt the
minimum protection standards afforded to authors; and (2) if a country enacts

15. Id. at 34-35.
16. Id. at 34.
17. WIPO-Administered Treaties, Contracting Parties, Berne Convention, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited July 22, 2017).
18. Id.
19. JON M. GARON, ENTERTAINMENT LAW AND PRACTICE 41 (2d ed. 2014).
20. Id.
21. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 8, at 35.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 35-36.
26. GARON, supra note 19, at 41.
27. Id.
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additional protection to its domestic authors, it must extend those same
protections to authors of other member countries.28
Today, there are 174 members of the Berne Convention, including
the United States.29 To understand the current climate of international trade
in cultural goods, it is imperative to first understand the ways in which the
United States benefited for more than one hundred years by not being a Berne
member state. Because there was virtually no protection for British materials
published or sold in the States, U.S.-American consumers became “hooked
on inexpensive books” by the late-nineteenth century.30 While U.S.
consumers may have been singing praises for the cheap price of cultural
goods during this time, U.S.-American authors were not joining the chorus.
Because there was no obligation to properly compensate foreign authors for
works sold Stateside, U.S. authors became severely underpriced in the
marketplace by works by British authors, and were increasingly vulnerable
to foreign piracy.31
Opponents to comprehensive copyright reform argued cheap books
were essential to promoting “literacy, especially on the frontier,” and that
“extending copyright protection to foreigners meant granting a monopoly to
them at the expense of the American reading public.”32 Plus, U.S. publishing
houses and their employees depended on piracy to maintain competitiveness
in the marketplace.33 While Congress did eventually enact legislation that
created a pathway to protection for foreign works, the U.S. government’s
sustained failure to intervene during the “cheap books” movement
demonstrated, at best, its apathy (and at worst, its disdain) toward extending
protection to foreign works.
The U.S. was reluctant to extend protection to foreign materials
during the nation’s infancy, but would find itself on the other side of the
copyright protection quarrel about one hundred years later, as its media and
technology enterprises flourished. As trade of intellectual property-based
goods began rising in the mid-twentieth century, the protection of IPRs
became even more vital to global success of the industries which depended
upon payments stemming from IP-based products. Accordingly, a push for
more forceful international enforcement of IPRs surfaced. The Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) arose out
of these efforts, led mostly by developed countries, to encourage the
enforcement of intellectual property (“IP”) goods traded abroad.34 Economic
giants with growing technology and media industries had great incentive to

28. Id.
29. WIPO, supra note 17.
30. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 50 (2003).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 51.
33. Id.
34. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 8, at 73-74.
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create an agreement that would address the protection of IP goods in the
global marketplace.35
TRIPS was heavily negotiated during the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) Uruguay Round on September 20, 1986.36 In
the years leading up to the Uruguay Round, Western European nations and
the United States petitioned GATT (which eventually became the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”))37 for stricter enforcement measures for the
trade of IP goods.38 The purported goal of the negotiations as adopted by the
negotiating parties in the GATT Ministerial Declaration was “to reduce the
distortions and impediments to international trade.”39 This was to be
accomplished by “taking into account the need to promote effective and
adequate protection of intellectual property rights.”40 The Ministerial
Declaration also recognized it was imperative that the “measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade. . . .”41
From the outset, developing and developed countries held different
ideas about what means would properly meet the desired ends stated in the
Declaration. For example, India’s position during the Uruguay Round
negotiations was that the national treatment and most-favored-nation
provisions should be narrow, so to only extend to material goods, and not to
the underlying intellectual property.42 In contrast, economically developed
countries took the position that the agreement should have broad coverage,
encompassing the Berne Convention rights and moral rights,43 as embodied
in the other standing copyright treaties.44
The disparity in intellectual property know-how during the Uruguay
Round negotiations provides context to the discussions, and their eventual
outcome. The U.S. came to the negotiation table on behalf of a $650 billion
annual pharmaceutical industry, an $800 billion global software and

35. Id. at 73.
36. Id. at 75.
37. The WTO In Brief: Part 1: The Multilateral Trading System – Past, Present, and
Future, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr01_e.htm (last
visited July 22, 2017).
38. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 8, at 75.
39. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Declaration of 20 September
1986 at 7, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240152.pdf.
40. Id.
41. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 8, at 75.
42. Id. at 76.
43. Moral rights protect against the distortion or mutilation of copyrighted works
which the author may consider detrimental to her reputation. Unlike the other rights
embodied in the Berne Convention, moral rights cannot be assigned or waived, even if the
author no longer holds the copyright in the work. There is disagreement as to whether the
treatment of moral rights by the U.S. is compliant with the terms of the Berne Convention.
GARON, supra note 19, at 43.
44. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 8, at 75-76.
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entertainment industry, and a $21 million commercial seed industry.45
Technology industries were growing rapidly around the globe during the
1980s, and the U.S. felt increased threats of foreign competition.46 These
threats were heightened by the lack of enforcement of IPRs abroad; IP
products created in the U.S. were at the mercy of the importing country to
properly compensate the holders of the underlying IP embodied in those
products.47 The U.S.—the same country that fervently resisted protecting
foreign works for the better portion of its existence—was now the champion
of strong IPR protection across the globe.
The U.S. recruited other developed and technology-driven countries
in the campaign for stricter enforcement of IPRs abroad.48 Developed
countries had a particularly strong interest in robust IP enforcement: 80% of
the world’s IPRs at the time were held by entities in developed countries.49
These developed nations argued that increased IPR protection would
“encourage foreign direct investment (“FDI”), innovation, and technology
transfer, and spur the development of national cultural and creative
industries,” as well as “help protect public health and safety” against
counterfeit medicines and products.50
On the other side of the negotiating table sat a small swath of
developing nations. Only about twenty nations from the developing world
came to the negotiations with the resources and expertise needed to
adequately understand the implications of the discussions.51 The
deliberations concerned highly technical copyright and patent legislation
schemes, and developing countries—some of which did not even have
copyright or patent laws on the books in their own countries at the time—
struggled to fully grasp the minutia of the complex schemes.52 The countries
that did have the requisite savvy, namely Brazil and India, may have faced
other international political pressures to accept the terms of the agreement.53
Needless to say, “[t]he IP playing field was uneven.”54

45. CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (2009).
46. Id. at 7-8.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 8 (stating the European Union and Japan joined the U.S. in its campaign for
stronger IPR enforcement).
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. A major point of contention during the TRIPS negotiations was striking a
balance between patent protection and access to health in the developing world. The patent
implications of TRIPS are outside of the scope of this Note, but an understanding of this
contentious issue is vital to understanding the context of the negotiations.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 9.
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The final terms of TRIPS reflect the “widely accepted” view that “the
U.S. made virtually no concessions” during the negotiations.55 Perhaps the
U.S. push for stronger international protection of IP goods should come as
no surprise, considering the country’s significant interest in ensuring its
technological and entertainment products received adequate protection in
markets across the globe. Still, the U.S. transformation from having no
interest in extending meaningful copyright protections to foreign materials
during the time from the “cheap books” movement, to its hardline protection
position at the TRIPS drawing table, is remarkable.
B.

TRIPS Gets a Sidekick: The Powerful Force of the WTO

TRIPS initiated a monumental shift in international IP market
treatment in three ways: by (1) extending the reach of several of the Berne
Convention provisions; (2) requiring ratification of TRIPS as a prerequisite
to WTO membership; and (3) providing redress for infringement through the
WTO dispute-settlement body.56
Just as the Berne Convention initially included the minimum rights
of translation and public performance, TRIPS provides an additional series
of minimum rights for a copyright holder that better reflect the needed
protections of the modern era. TRIPS incorporated by reference all of the
Berne Convention rights in its Article 9, with the exception of the moral
rights provision.57 The Berne Convention and TRIPS now provide copyright
holders with the rights of translation, reproduction, performance, broadcast,
public recitation, and adaptation.58 These are baseline rights that each
member nation must observe and enforce in its domestic copyright regime. 59
Article 19 of the Berne Convention, as incorporated by TRIPS, entitles
governments to promulgate “any greater protection” by legislation.60
A member state cannot provide “any greater protection” to its
nationals while excluding the nationals of other member states, however,
under the principles of national treatment.61 Article 3 of TRIPS (the “National
Treatment” provision) requires member nations to afford “nationals of other
55. BLAYNE HAGGART, COPYFIGHT: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
REFORM 83 (2014).
56. See id. at 84.
57. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 9, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 301 (1994) (amended Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter TRIPS] (incorporating by reference
Arts. 1-21 of the Berne Convention, and excepting Art. 6bis).
58. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, arts. 8, 9,
11, 11bis, 11ter, 12 (respectively), Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
59. GARON, supra note 19, at 41-42. The Berne Convention can be self-executing
(nation adopts the treaty as the law of the land), or implemented by government in its
copyright legislation (as done in the U.S.).
60. Berne Convention, supra note 58, at art. 19.
61. Id.; See also TRIPS, supra note 57, at art. 3.
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Member[ ] [States] treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property.”62 Under the
doctrine of National Treatment, no TRIPS nation can extend benefits to its
citizens that it does not extend to foreign nationals, subject to all of the
exceptions provided for in the Berne Convention.63
Complementary to the National Treatment provision is the MostFavoured Nation clause embodied in Article 4 of TRIPS (“Most-FavouredNation clause” or “MFN clause”). The MFN clause prohibits a TRIPS
member nation from extending additional protections to another nation’s IPR
holders at the exclusion of others.64 It requires that “any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other
country . . . be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of
all other Members.”65 Essentially, this provision prevents one nation from
promoting, or favorably treating, another nation, so that a region or group of
countries cannot collude in affording additional protections while refraining
from offering these protections to others.66
Because TRIPS largely encompassed the standing Berne Convention
minimum rights provisions, the true strength of TRIPS rests in its powerful
intertwinement with the WTO. TRIPS is one agreement in the WTO system
of multilateral treaties, and its ratification is a prerequisite to WTO
membership.67 The WTO “is the only international organization dealing with
the global rules of trade between nations.”68 The organization implements
and oversees negotiations for the global multilateral trading system by
establishing agreements which act as “legal ground-rules for international
commerce.”69 The WTO’s “overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely
as possible” by reducing barriers to trade wherever appropriate.70 Therefore,
a country’s accession into the WTO allows the country to tap into a network
of global trade systems designed to progress the free flow of trade.71 This
network is especially imperative for developing countries that long to gain
access to developed markets at lower tariff rates.72 Of the WTO’s 164

62. TRIPS, supra note 57, at art. 3.
63. Id.
64. TRIPS, supra note 57, at art. 4.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See DEERE, supra note 45, at 10.
68. The WTO in brief, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief
_e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited July 22, 2017).
69. Id.
70. Who We Are, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are
_e.htm (last visited July 22, 2017).
71. See id.
72. See The WTO can help countries develop, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/the
wto_e/whatis_e/10thi_e/10thi06_e.htm (last visited July 22, 2017).
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member states,73 two-thirds are developing countries.74 By virtue of their
WTO membership status, these developing nations are given a seat at the
world market table.
A member state that believes its rights under a WTO agreement are
being infringed by another member state can bring a claim through the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.75 The WTO considers dispute settlement
“one of [its] core activities,” and has issued over 350 rulings in various trade
disagreements since its establishment in 1995.76 The Dispute Settlement
Body has the authority to impose trade restrictions on member states if it
finds the state is in violation of one of its agreements, including suspension
from the WTO itself.77 Therefore, tethering TRIPS to WTO membership is
powerful because the WTO Dispute Settlement Body oversees the
implementation and enforcement of the TRIPS provisions.78
As a result of the expansion of the Berne rights and its significant
relation to and enforcement by the WTO, TRIPS ushered in a “new and
unparalleled emphasis on making privately held IP rights enforceable,
demanding stronger provisions in national IP laws to promote enforcement
of IP rights at the border and within the domestic market.”79
C.

Latin America Suits Up

Article 65 of TRIPS built in certain safeguards for developing
countries to allow for easier implementation of the TRIPS obligations into
their substantive law. Developing countries, including the Latin American
signatories, were given until January 1, 2000 to implement its terms.80
TRIPS attempted to accommodate the needs of developing nations
by providing additional support in implementing the IP regime required by
its terms.81 TRIPS provided transition periods for implementation, required
developed countries to enhance technology transfers to the developing world,

73. WTO Members and Observers, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited July 22, 2017).
74. Kimberly Amadeo, WTO Members: Categories and Benefits, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/wto-membership-benefits-and-importance-3306364 (last
updated July 11, 2017).
75. WTO Dispute Settlement, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_e.htm (last visited July 22, 2017).
76. Id.
77. See A Unique Contribution, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis
_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited July 22, 2017).
78. Id.
79. DEERE, supra note 45, at 10-11.
80. Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus Protection and Impacts in Latin
America, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 222 (2007); TRIPS, supra
note 57, at art. 65.
81. Id. at 12.
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and committed developed countries to providing technological aid and
capacity-building to lesser developed countries.82
Overall, implementation of the TRIPS standards in Latin America
was “uneven,” with none of the Latin American countries taking full
advantage of the aforementioned flexibilities provided to developing
countries for smooth TRIPS implementation. 83 Further, many countries in
this region executed, and continue to execute, free trade agreements with the
U.S. through which the countries backed away from fully utilizing the TRIPS
implementation breaks available to them.84 Latin American countries that
elected to enter free trade agreements largely forfeited the right to
implementation benefits afforded them under TRIPS.85
Despite not taking advantage of some of the TRIPS implementation
breaks, most Latin American countries had fully implemented the TRIPS
obligations by 2000, as required to maintain TRIPS and WTO compliance.86
In that year, WTO complaints were filed against both Argentina and Brazil,
alleging certain “violations of TRIPS standards.”87 In both cases the parties
reached agreements prior to a ruling before a WTO panel.88 No complaints
have since been filed before the WTO against a Latin American nation,
although certain controversial TRIPS provisions continue to delay complete
compliance in the region.89
Latin America became blanketed by the “one-size-fits-all” TRIPS
model at the turn of the twenty-first century, drastically changing the nature
of the IPR landscape of the area.90 For better or worse, the implementation of
TRIPS, forcefully backed by the power of the WTO, means it is “more
difficult than ever before for developing countries to shy from their
international IP commitments.”91
II:

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BECOME NET IMPORTERS OF
CULTURAL GOODS

For the developing world, implementing and enforcing TRIPS is a
costly venture. The unique features of the creative industries call for the
precarious balancing of cultural preservation against commercial
exploitation. This Part will begin by detailing the uniqueness of the creative
82. Id.
83. Correa, supra note 80, at 222.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 257.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Diana Barrowclough & Zeljka Kozul-Wright, Voice, Choice and Diversity
Through Creative Industries, in CREATIVE INDUSTRIES & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 22 (Diana
Barrowclough & Zeljka Kozul-Wright eds., 2008).
91. DEERE, supra note 45, at 12.

2018]

CAPITÁN AMÉRICA

295

sector in terms of its cultural nature and potential to be rather lucrative and
discuss the balance IPR protection measures seek to strike. Next, this Part
will examine how TRIPS has led Latin American countries to increasingly
import media from high-income countries and has restrained the ability of
Latin American countries to encourage domestic development of IP
industries, resulting in an overall loss of domestic cultural goods. Lastly, this
Part will explore how the increased consumption of foreign cultural goods
could impact Latin American culture.
A.

Not Your Average Industry

IP-based products wed tangible mediums (CDs, DVDs, books, etc.)
with underlying cultural expression (music, film, literature, etc.) to form a
single economic good. Thus, proper IPR protection is vitally necessary to
ensure the economic survival of the creative industry, especially as
technology continues to radically change the landscape of media and
entertainment consumption across the world.
Creative industries are those “that have their origin in individual
creativity, skill and talent with a potential for wealth and job creation through
the generation and exploitation of intellectual property.”92 Economic value
to the creator is derived from leveraging the IPRs embodied in the final
product.93 Thus, without adequate legal protection for the underlying IPRs,
the creator is cut out of the equation and retains zero economic benefit from
contributing to the work.94 Because the creative sector combines intangible
cultural expression with tangible goods, the market is unlikely to correct
itself and provide for the economic needs of the creator without a proper legal
framework in place.95 As the global market for cultural goods and services,
and the risks imposed by illegal copying, grows, so does the importance of
incentivizing IP policies.
While copyright laws serve an important economic role by ensuring
financial reward to the creator of the underlying work, the nature of a
copyrightable good inherently incorporates a cultural element which IP laws
should also be designed to nurture, without significantly limiting the public’s
access to knowledge-based products. Distinct from traditional goods,
copyright-based products “rely on creativity and knowledge more than other
activities.”96 Thus, it becomes increasingly essential to strike a balance
between ensuring the economic benefit to the creator, on one hand, and
allowing the public access to knowledge and cultural expression, on the
other.97
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 90, at 4.
See id. at 4-5.
Id.
See id. at 19.
Id. at 4.
See id. at 14-15.
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For developing countries, properly striking this balance is vital to the
ability to produce competitive cultural goods for sale in the global market. In
addition to the difficulty of promulgating sustainable copyright legislation,
developing countries also face increased barriers to entry due to the structure
of the key creative sectors themselves.98
First, the creative industry is largely dominated by large, vertically
integrated oligopolies with extensive distribution channels.99 This is
especially evident in the film sector, where foreign-owned cinemas have
remarkably efficient value chains and the propensity to exclude local content
from its screens in favor of international blockbusters.100 Efficient and valueadding distribution channels are key to the success of marketing a cultural
product.101
Second, high-income countries wield the benefits of economies of
scale to affordably produce, market, and disseminate cultural goods across
the globe.102 Developing countries typically do not have the same advantages
of scale, so breaking through national borders is comparably very difficult
and expensive.103 Third, financing large-scale cultural projects is challenging
because such products often involve high up-front capital costs, the product
cycle is typically very fast, and there is an amplified risk that the product
offering will not be well-received by the public.104
While technology may render it increasingly difficult to protect
copyrighted products, internet services may also have the lesser-appreciated
effect of relaxing these barriers to entry.105 For creative industry newcomers
in the era of YouTube106 and SoundCloud,107 it is possible to release creative
content to the worldwide public from any location using relatively affordable
production equipment. Thus, while technology poses a novel threat to current
copyright schemes, it also provides novel potential for creators in developing
countries to exploit their works on a global stage.
The aforementioned barriers to entry coupled with unworkable
copyright laws have led to some unfavorable general trends in the creative
industries of the developing world.108 The lack of infrastructure to support a
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 21.
105. See id. at 14.
106. See About YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/.
107. See What is SoundCloud?, SOUNDCLOUD, https://help.soundcloud.com/hc/enus/articles/115003570488-What-is-SoundCloud- (“SoundCloud is the world’s leading social
sound platform where anyone can listen to or create sounds and share them everywhere.”).
108. As with any general trend, there are also some noteworthy exceptions. In
particular, the BRIC countries have generally been successful in leveraging FDI to promote
their domestic creative industries. See Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 90, at 1112.
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creative sector has caused developing countries to lose “place in terms of
high value-added and service exports” and to “become increasingly
dependent upon exports of commodities.”109 While the creative industries of
developed countries are characterized by modern and mass production, the
creative industries of the developing world “remain craft-based or art-based
cottage industries.”110 In fact, 60% of Latin American exports of all cultural
goods in 2013 were visual arts and crafts.111
The creative industries currently occupy a unique position due to
their earning potential on the world market, and Latin America’s recent
struggle to capitalize on the growth of this sector puts it at a significant
disadvantage. Evaluating the financial position of the U.S. media and
entertainment112 (“M&E”) sector provides insight not only into the
stronghold the U.S. has on foreign markets, but also indicates the influence
the U.S. has in negotiating on an international level. The U.S. M&E industry
makes up one-third of the total global M&E sector, bringing in $632 billion
in revenues in 2015.113 Those revenues are predicted to grow to $771 billion
by 2019.114 The trade balance for the filmed entertainment sector alone in
2014 weighed in the favor of the U.S. to the tune of a striking $16.3 billion
trade surplus.115 On the whole, the U.S. has run a trade surplus in arts culture
every year since 2006, reaching $24.1 billion in 2013.116
The potential for great success in the creative sector is evident from
the numbers generated by the U.S. industry alone, which enjoys global
success for distribution of its cultural products. Latin America should not
forgo the opportunity to cash in on this financially and culturally valuable
market. To cash in on this opportunity, Latin America must also navigate the
sometimes-tumultuous terrain of international copyright law. With these
goals in tow, Latin American countries should aim to decrease foreign
imports and promote domestic production through effective navigation of its
copyright policies within the TRIPS framework.
109. Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 90, at 11.
110. Id. at 5.
111. UNESCO INST. FOR STATISTICS, The Globalisation of Cultural Trade: A Shift in
Consumption, 39 fig. 27 (2016) [hereinafter UNESCO], http://uis.unesco.org/
sites/default/files/documents/the-globalisation-of-cultural-trade-a-shift-in-consumptioninternational-flows-of-cultural-goods-services-2004-2013-en_0.pdf.
112. The Media and Entertainment sector, as defined by U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade Administration, consists of four segments: (1) Filmed entertainment
(including film, television, home video); (2) Music; (3) Book publishing; (4) Video games.
2016 Top Markets Report Media and Entertainment, U.S. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.
gov/topmarkets/pdf/Media_and_Entertainment_Top_Markets_Report.pdf (Oct. 2016).
113. Media and Entertainment Spotlight, SELECT USA, https://www.selectusa.gov/
media-entertainment-industry-united-states (last visited July 22, 2017).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Arts and Cultural Production Contributed $704.2 Billion to the U.S. Economy in
2013, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS, (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.arts.gov/news/2016/artsand-cultural-production-contributed-7042-billion-us-economy-2013.
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Trouble on the Homefront

Certain TRIPS implications bear directly on the expansion of the
trade deficits Latin America experiences in the creative sectors. First,
implementing TRIPS was an extremely expensive endeavor for developing
countries.117 Developing countries continue to spend large sums of money
enforcing TRIPS standards, thereby constraining government funding which
otherwise might be dedicated to fostering domestic markets (to the extent
permitted under the National Treatment requirements of TRIPS).118 Second,
the forced implementation of baseline copyright standards means that
developing countries miss out of the “reverse engineering” stage of
development that many developed countries, including the United States,
enjoyed at similar points in their development.119 The result of missing this
stage means developing countries will continue to lag behind their developed
counterparts unless an intentional counter-movement is made. Third, TRIPS
makes mandatory copyright standards which may not align with the standing
domestic policies and infrastructure, and thus enforcement cannot always be
carried out effectively.120 As a result, developing countries bear the burden
of TRIPS enforcement while realizing very little of the benefits of stronger
IP protection.
The worry of some initial opponents to TRIPS who argued that
TRIPS would increase the price of educational and cultural products in
developing countries and thus impede on domestic development has
somewhat come to fruition in the twenty-plus years since its promulgation.121
Proponents argued TRIPS would encourage FDI, innovation and technology
transfer, and that domestic creative industries would benefit from stronger IP
protection.122 TRIPS proponents also asserted consumers would be protected
by stronger copyright standards which would reduce counterfeit and ensure
quality of goods.123
While the latter camp’s views are certainly not unfounded, the
former’s predictions have also proven true. TRIPS implementation and
continued enforcement is costly. Many developing countries had to rely
greatly on outside legal counsel to weave TRIPS protections into their
standing policies within the implementation period.124 To implement TRIPS,
member states not only had to create new legislation, but also had to put
registration systems in place, train staff, and provide enforcement

117. DEERE, supra note 45, at 10.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 9.
120. See HAGGART, supra note 55, at 5-6.
121. See DEERE, supra note 45, at 9-10.
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 10.
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mechanisms.125 Astonishing losses occasionally accompanied these costs.
The World Bank estimated in 2002 that TRIPS implementation would result
in annual net losses in payment for technology and in FDI flows for Mexico
of $2.5 billion, for Brazil of $530 million, for China of $5.1 billion, for India
of U.S. $903 million, and for Republic of Korea of $15.3 billion.126 These
costs greatly strain the pockets of developing countries, many of which have
other public interests demanding government funds.127
TRIPS also prevents developing countries from benefitting from two
things that greatly benefitted developed countries at earlier points of their
growth: copying and reverse engineering.128 Developing countries are net
importers of IP, and thus “s[eek] to employ the same strategies of copying
and reverse engineering that had served developed countries at similar stages
of development.”129 Opponents of TRIPS pushed to “limit the recognition of
IP rights for foreigners,” arguing that “[f]lexibility regarding the scope and
terms of IP rights granted within their borders was . . . central to national
efforts to promote national industrial capacity, generate employment, and
ensure affordable access to essential technologies and knowledge.”130 The
strength National Treatment requirement demonstrates that developed
countries were not entirely successful on this stance.131
As a result, developing countries cannot use the advancements of the
developed world to progress domestic industries. Of course, this conduct is
precisely what IP laws seek to prohibit, and developed countries can hardly
be criticized for wanting to collect on their creative or technological
successes and preclude others from inappropriately capitalizing on the
copyright holder’s rights in the work. Ultimately, however, the ban against
reverse engineering widens the gap between the developed and developing
worlds because creators in developing countries cannot benefit from the
discoveries of the developed world, and instead must pay higher fees in order
to possess these products. Some critics color this unfair, because “[n]ow’developed’ countries like the United States may have industrialized through
the free appropriation of other countries’ ‘intellectual property,’ but TRIPS
makes it impossible for today’s developing countries to take the same
path.”132

125. Carsten Fink, Intellectual Property and the WTO 11 (2004),
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25931. Note, however, that Fink suggests these measures may
have been taken regardless of the TRIPS requirements. He is addressing Mexico, in
particular, which made these changes prior to coming under TRIPS obligations.
126. Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, WORLD BANK 133
(2002).
127. DEERE, supra note 45, at 10.
128. Id. at 9.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See TRIPS, supra note 57, at art. 3.
132. HAGGART, supra note 55, at 69.
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The third TRIPS-related factor contributing to the disparity in
creative output between developing and developed countries is the
mandatory baseline copyright protections embodied in the agreement. The
national policies of countries with highly lucrative content industries reach
beyond domestic borders to influence the international treatment of such
industries, consequently decreasing the ability of developing countries “to
exercise copyright-policy autonomy and implement policies that reflect their
citizens’ economic and cultural needs.”133
At the risk of stating the obvious, IPRs are foremost property rights,
strongly rooted in ideals of Western capitalism.134 The underlying concepts
of copyright protection, such as originality and uniqueness, are “Western in
origin,” and shape the entire framework for IPR regulation.135 The notion of
piracy, for example, is drenched with illegality from a Western property right
perspective, while other countries with a less absolute idea of personal
property rights would not have such a negative association with the use of
one’s creative work to further the creative or intellectual objectives of
another.136 In fact, if the policy argument for copyright protection is to
encourage the development of creative and educational works in order to
benefit the greater society, it can be argued that overly-stringent copyright
policies serve as a barrier to this purported goal. Requiring developing
countries to implement copyright policies that contradict with their domestic
objectives creates dissonance in the country, and ultimately restricts the
country from being able to promulgate workable laws that would grow its
domestic industries.
Because cultural goods exist at the intersection of “the intangible and
the tangible,” their development, purchase, and sale is difficult to capture
with traditional data.137 The difficulty in tracking the flows of cultural goods
and services has increased with the growth of internet-based services,
especially with regards to transactions taking place in illegal markets.
Currently, organizations dedicated to providing reliable data on international
trade are encouraging countries to take measures to better track the flows of
cultural goods and services.138
Still, the data collected demonstrates that the global market for
entertainment and media goods has bourgeoned since the promulgation of
TRIPS.139 For the most part, however, developing countries are being left out
of the global success.140 For example, while a recent study showed
“considerable weight of copyright related-industries in Argentina and Brazil
(around 6 per cent of GNP),” the study also notes, “most value added is
133. Id. at 5.
134. Id. at 52.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 90, at 3.
138. See UNESCO, supra note 111.
139. Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 90, at 6.
140. See generally, Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 90.
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contributed by the distribution of imported copyright works rather than the
local production thereof,” thereby resulting in “significant trade deficits in
this area.”141 This pattern of stricter IP protection resulting in net importation
of cultural products is common among countries that are not top producers
of creative goods.142 In fact, Canada recently resisted stronger IP legislation
noting, “stronger copyright laws always increase the country’s trade deficit
in royalties.”143
These trade deficits are important because they demonstrate that
Latin Americans, and many other nationals in developing countries, are
increasingly consuming media created in, by, and for foreign markets. While
there are benefits associated with importing high-quality creative goods,
including access to diverse international products at a relatively cheap price,
“unless developing countries start producing their own films, music and other
creative products, they will increasingly find themselves importing them.”144
A 2013 UNESCO Report on the international flow of cultural goods
and services provides valuable insight into the dynamics of cultural goods
and services relative to a country’s income.145 According to the Report, for
example, while economies of every income bracket import audiovisual and
performance goods to some degree, only high-income and upper-middleincome economies export them.146 This sector experienced a 112% growth
between 2004 and 2013, but the entire audiovisual sector was dominated by
only a handful of countries in 2013.147 Similarly, nine of the ten top exporters
for the “Performance and Celebration Domain” of the Report were highincome countries.148 The U.S. alone exported $3.3 billion of goods in this
domain in 2013.149
High-income earners enjoy an even larger lead in the realm of
creative services, as compared to creative goods. From 2003 to 2013, high141. Correa, supra note 80, at 224 (citing OMPI-UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE
CAMPINAS, ESTUDIO SOBRE LA IMPORTANCIA ECONÓMICA DE LAS INDUSTRIAS Y
ACTIVIDADES PROTEGIDAS POR EL DERECHO DE AUTOR Y LOS DERECHOS CONEXOS EN LOS
PAÍSES DE MERCOSUR Y CHILE 62-63 (2002)) (emphasis added).
142. HAGGART, supra note 55, at 242.
143. Id.
144. Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 90, at 12.
145. See UNESCO, supra note 111. Note that UNESCO’s definition of “cultural
goods” reaches beyond the scope of the copyright industries by including most copyright
industries, cultural education, national heritage, tourism, sports, festivals, libraries, and
museums. UNESCO also evaluates “cultural services” in the Report, which more closely
reflect the workings of copyright industries because the services deal with the underlying
transactions not relative to the product itself, such as payment of royalties and fees.
146. UNESCO, supra note 111, at 41, figs. 29 and 30.
147. Id.
148. UNESCO, supra note 111, at 36, 44. The Performance and Celebration Domain
encompasses musical instruments and recorded media, such as CDs. The only non-highincome country in the group was China, which manufactures large amounts of CDs and
other media products in this domain, and therefore may skew the data for copyright
purposes.
149. Id. at 44.
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income economies held 90% of the world’s exports for cultural services.150
The U.S. alone enjoyed a trade surplus of $45.1 billion for cultural services
in 2012; Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil all experienced trade deficits
in the amounts of $100 million, $300 million, $400 million, and $600 million
respectively.151 Perhaps predictably, the Report found that cultural services
are “highly dominated by high-income economies.”152
Further, the Report examined the global film market and discussed
the increased similarity of successful films on a worldwide scale, concluding
that the same movies are seen around the world, regardless of income level.153
Film studios are progressively collecting increased revenues from
international box offices, with Warner Brothers deriving 62% of its box
offices sales from international markets in 2013.154 With potential for high
profits abroad, film giants are increasingly seeking to promote and distribute
to every corner of the globe. As a result, “at least one-half of the top 10
movies seen in 2012 and 2013 were the same movies in 71% of the countries
surveyed” by the UNESCO Report.155 In the majority of countries surveyed,
only 30% of a particular country’s top ten films of 2012 and 2013 were
produced domestically.156 Domestic films comprised less than 20% of the top
ten films of 2012 and 2013 in the Latin American countries surveyed.157
Latin America has even found itself importing cultural goods which
have origins in the region but are produced in the U.S., as is the case of the
vibrant Latin music industry.158 The region is known for a prolific music
sector, bolstering a significant share of world music consumption.159 Perhaps
unfortunately for Latin America, however, many successful musicians in
Latin America are “poached” by U.S. major labels after the musician has
garnered regional fame.160 The royalties generated by these popular artists
are accordingly funneled into the pockets of the U.S. entities that own the
rights.161 Because distribution in Latin America is built on scale, U.S. media
conglomerates are best situated to be successful in this region.162 However,
the globalization of media outlets “generates an increasing disconnection of

150. Id. at 70, fig. 53.
151. Id. at 72, fig. 56.
152. Id. at 76.
153. Id. at 78, fig. 60.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 77.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 78, fig. 60.
158. Stuart Cunningham, Mark David Ryan, Michael Keane & Diego Ordonez,
Financing Creative Industries in Developing Countries, in CREATIVE INDUSTRIES &
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 65, 75 (Diana Barrowclough & Zeljka Kozul-Wright eds., 2008).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 91.
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the local audiences with Indigenous genres, a situation that is illustrated in
some Latin American music industries.”163
Thus, the infiltration of Western entertainment media in Latin
America has deepened. As a result, the various cultures of Latin America
could lose their distinctive voices and competitiveness in the clatter of the
international media market.
C.

Latin American Consumers Need a Héroe

Global homogenization of product offerings, including those
originating from creative industries, creates “reduced consumer choice and
welfare losses.”164 In the media realm, homogenization is “facilitated by an
absence of strong local creative industries and the presence of westerndependent media structures, resulting in the inability to resist the external
media monopolies.”165 The result is a one-dimensional cultural product
offering, which greatly reduces diversity of choice.
Homogenization of copyright-based goods is particularly
problematic because such products are a part of the knowledge economy, and
are therefore inseparably intertwined with culture.166 As global media
conglomerates “attempt to control the market by determining taste in order
to guarantee demand” for their creative products, these entities
“progressively diminish diversity in market choices.”167 For example,
Hollywood realizes the majority of its revenues in box offices abroad, but
most of the production inputs (writers, actors, shooting locations, etc.) have
a U.S. origin.168 The circulation of foreign films in the U.S. domestic market,
meanwhile, is less than 3%.169
In the television industry, a “small number of media conglomerates
controlling the global market [have] reduced the offering of television
products throughout the world” so that people of different countries are
tuning into the same programs.170 This trend does not necessarily reflect
viewer preference, however.171 In fact, studies show audiences in both
developed and developing countries “have a preference for local content.”172
The success of regional movie centers, such as “Nollywood” in Nigeria or
“Bollywood” in India, provide at least anecdotal support for this assertion.173
163. Id.
164. Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 90, at 12.
165. Id.
166. Anna Jaguaribe, The Policy Parameters, in CREATIVE INDUSTRIES & DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 305, 311 (Diana Barrowclough & Zeljka Kozul-Wright eds., 2008).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 314.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 315.
172. Id.
173. See LARS ECKSTEIN & ANJA SCHWARZ, POSTCOLONIAL PIRACY: MEDIA
DISTRIBUTION AND CULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 92 (2014) (quoting Igwe:
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In her essay The Policy Parameters, Anna Jaguaribe details this
system in which “the consumption of culture is tied with economic
achievement.”174 She demonstrates the cyclical nature of the industry in
which high-income earners have the financial leverage to create “diversified
service sectors, which in turn increase the demand for cultural goods.”175 As
a result, creative goods are transformed into “tradable commodities” by the
creation of a global mass market for such products.176 Because developing
countries lack the resources to compete with their developed counterparts,
they “are usually relegated to the position of consumers of imported cultural
goods and services and producers of folklore.”177
In the modern era, media at least informs, and at most constructs,
culture.178 Instead of “institutions, such as the school, church and public
ordinances” serving as the basis for cultural communication, “media
exchanges and consumption of symbolic creative goods and services” now
serve as the primary communication of culture.179 Because developed
countries have such a strong-hold on the creative industries, developing
countries will face an even more pressing need to curate creative products
which reflect local culture if they wish to preserve it.180
III:

FOSTERING DEVELOPMENT OF THE CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN
LATIN AMERICA

Typically, developing countries face a disadvantage in the creative
sectors as compared to their developed counterparts not only because there
is a more pressing need for governmental financial support for the arts, but
because of the need to funnel governmental money into other areas of public
aid.181 TRIPS makes it even more difficult to provide incentives to local
creators because of its National Treatment provision and by mandating
countries adopt a specific copyright regime that is not tailored to its legal
structure.
This Part will first discuss measures taken by other countries on the
outskirts of the global entertainment industry that have proven successful in
sustaining culturally and economically efficient production models. Next,
this Part will evaluate how these models may be integrated into the Latin
American framework and suggest an international co-production strategy to
capitalize on Latin America’s distinct advantages of cultural vibrancy and
“[T]he first Nollywood movie was a story ‘being told by our people to our people . . . What
is most important is that movies aren’t just business, they are cultural expression.”).
174. Jaguaribe, supra note 166, at 313.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 317.
181. Cunningham et al., supra note 158, at 65.
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mostly common language. In doing so, this Part will also address how these
measures could be implemented without violating any standing TRIPS
obligations or threatening a country’s WTO membership standing.
A.

A Vigilante No More: Framework for TRIPS Compliance

The Most Favoured Nation and National Treatment clauses of
TRIPS greatly constrict any nation’s ability to implement regulations that
would benefit local production of copyright-related goods at a disadvantage
to foreign products. Additionally, TRIPS limits a country’s ability to
promulgate IP laws that best promote the creative industries because of its
mandatory baseline protections. Failure to comply with these provisions puts
countries at significant risk of WTO-imposed sanctions.
Developing countries must, therefore, be strategic in their efforts to
promote domestic creative industries while maintaining TRIPS compliance.
In her essay Promoting Creative Industries: Public Policies in Support of
Film, Music and Broadcasting,” Dr. Verena Wiedemann provides four
conditions, discussed below, which support a vibrant creative industry sector
while recognizing first and foremost that “no single set of policies can be
described as optimal for the developing world.”182 Instead, policies designed
to promote the creative industries of the developing world should be
implemented taking the “country’s creative sectors, its resources, and its
other policy priorities” into account.”183
The first necessary condition Dr. Wiedemann identifies within this
framework is the freedom of speech.184 Authors must, fundamentally, have a
protected outlet for their own creative expressions.185 In turn, authors must
also be able to receive inspiration through interaction with a variety of
cultural products without restriction.186 Second to the right to free speech,
proper IPR protection regimes are integral to the vitality of a developing
country’s creative sector.187 While royalty collection agencies have
contributed to the overall enforcement of IPRs on a global level, the strength
of the domestic market depends on how closely tailored the copyright regime
is to the needs and understandings of the local artist community.188 Artists in
developing countries are at risk of being left out of this global success if their
creative works do not benefit from the copyright structures in place which

182. Verena Wiedemann, Promoting Creative Industries, in CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 251, 251 (Diana Barrowclough & Zeljka Kozul-Wright eds., 2008).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 252-53.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 253.
188. Id.
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compensate authors for their successes because of the indigenous artist’s
failure to comply with a technical requirement of copyright protection.189
Third, achieving “media pluralism” will ensure there are many
participants in the creative industry sector, so to avoid a few controlling the
whole.190 In pursuit of this goal, Dr. Wiedemann recommends limiting the
number of radio or television licenses a single owner may hold.191 If this step
is not taken at the outset, however, it might be impossible to achieve optimal
media plurality because once the industry is in the hands of a few, the
lobbying strength will be too powerful to counteract.192
Lastly, protecting the economic and social status of authors is central
to maintaining a vigorous creative industry.193 Governments and private
agencies alike should take advantage of non-conventional opportunities to
use the arts to support artists, such as providing social security to freelance
artists as it is provided for other self-employed individuals, and using the
proceeds of large-scale endeavors to fund artists.194 This prong becomes
increasingly important if artists are not included in the benefits of the
copyright scheme and therefore are not collecting royalties for their work.
B.

A Content Quota & Co-Production Fly-Over

With this framework in mind, policymakers can evaluate various
methods designed to support the creative sector in their own countries. While
many mechanisms for funding have proven successful in fostering domestic
creative industries,195 typically the most successful measures hazardously
hinge on the edges of the TRIPS provisions which prohibit favoring domestic
over foreign cultural products.196
One way in which countries ensure domestic artists are getting more
air-time in their own countries is by imposing content quotas on movie
189. Id. For example, TRIPS does away with registration requirements for obtaining a
copyright. Under TRIPS, an author obtains a copyright in the work once it is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. Many indigenous cultures, however, have a tradition of
passing creative works through oral expression and therefore never “fix” the work in a
tangible form. These works are, accordingly, barred from obtaining copyright protection.
Some agencies have started working to promulgate laws that would allow indigenous people
groups to receive the benefits from copyright protection without complying with the fixation
requirement.
190. Id. at 253-54.
191. Id. at 254.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. India provides one such example, where proceeds of the film “Gandhi” were
given to finance elderly local artists.
195. See id. Some examples of public funding include the following mechanisms:
public loans (carrying specific requirements regarding language, hiring of nationals, place of
commercial presence, etc.); tax incentives (using nationality-based criteria to provide writeoffs to producers); third-party taxation (deriving revenues from sales of related or unrelated
products); and subsidies (providing manufacturing for domestic artists).
196. See id.
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theaters, radio stations, and broadcasters. Under a quota system, a minimum
percentage of the total offerings must be domestically produced.197 Content
quotas are common in television and radio broadcasting around the world.198
In the European Union, for example, the majority of all television content
must originate from other E.U. states.199 Australia and Canada impose similar
quotas on television broadcasters, with 50% and 60% minimums,
respectively.200 In attempts to cultivate its local creative industry, Brazil
enacted a unique quota requirement in 2012 for pay-television stations, under
which television broadcasters must air three-and-a-half hours of domestic
material daily.201 Foreign producers looking to penetrate markets in which a
quota is in place are usually left with the option of partnering with local
enterprises to get screen time.202
Steep quotas do not come without their disadvantages, however. As
this minimum requirement increases, the diversity of product offerings
decreases, and the enforcement of the quota could even impinge on free
speech.203 Malaysia, which requires 80% domestic content, and China, which
requires 90% domestic content, could find themselves in this latter camp.204
Additionally, rigorous quotas can place a country at risk of violating
the National Treatment requirements of TRIPS and subject the country to
other trade-related sanctions.205 The case of South Korea illustrates the
benefits of film quotas on film distribution for generation of local content, as
well as the reactionary dangers which stem from the imposition of such
quotas. In 1993, Korean films held only a 15.9% share of the domestic
market.206 Recognizing a need to promote domestic film production, the
country imposed a screen quota under which 40% of cinema screens were
required to show domestic content.207 The quota now sits around 20%, but
the market share for Korean films has jumped to more than 50% in the years

197. Id. at 259.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 2016 Top Markets Report Media and Entertainment Case Study, U.S. INT’L TRADE
ADMIN., http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Media_and_Entertainment_Brazil.pdf;
Renata Acioli, In Brazil, Film and TV Law Fosters Industry Boom, SPARKSHEET, (Aug. 31,
2015), http://sparksheet.com/in-brazil-film-and-tv-law-fosters-industry-boom/.
202. See U.S. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 201, at 5 (previewing growth
opportunities if U.S. producers partner with local agencies).
203. Wiedemann, supra note 182, at 259.
204. Id.
205. For example, the U.S. Trade Representative issues its own “watch-list” of
countries found to be violating or infringing upon U.S. copyrights, called the Special 301
Report. A country could face severe trade sanctions from the U.S. if its conduct places it on
the Special 301 Report. See Special 301, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/Special-301.
206. Wiedemann, supra note 182, at 259.
207. Id.
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following the implementation of the quota.208 South Korea’s success with
content quotas for film has not gone unnoticed; the U.S. has pressured the
country to abolish its screen quotas.209
Complementary or alternatively to content quotas, international coproduction agreements have also increased the production of domestic
cultural goods, particularly in the audiovisual realm. Co-production
agreements are partnerships between countries which grant national
treatment to member states to ensure full access to the public funding
schemes available to each country.210 In a co-production framework, partners
agree to contribute a certain percentage or particular service to the overall
project and, in doing so, decrease the costs involved for any one partner.
Take, for example, an Australian film producer who wants to film a scene for
its movie at Iguazu Falls, in Argentina. This could be an expensive endeavor
as a foreign film producer. However, if Australia and Argentina enter a coproduction agreement, the Australian producer might partner with Argentine
crews to execute the shoot. The result is cost-saving for the Australian
partner, and revenue-gaining for the Argentine partner.
Additionally, co-production agreements involve less risk of violating
TRIPS than content quotas because they do not discriminate based solely on
origin. Instead, a film created through international co-production may have
many “domestic” homes, based on the sources of various inputs. Tracking
this earlier example, the film may be considered domestic to both Argentina
and Australia because of the nature of its production. Co-production
agreements allow producers of one country to tap into the resources of
another and create a transnational system of distribution, which is often the
costliest aspect of the audiovisual sector.211 This arrangement encourages the
exchange of cultural goods while increasing global competiveness in the
sector.212
The shared cost structure of co-production arrangements encourages
growth of entertainment and media production in the developing world while
maintaining TRIPS compliance. However, international co-production
agreements do not fully solve the issue of cultural homogenization and
dilution because the products themselves are designed to be successful to
wide audiences and may squash cultural individualism in the process.213

208. Id.; Sonia Kil, South Korea Proposes Quota for Art Movies, VARIETY MAG. (Mar.
10, 2016), http://variety.com/2016/film/asia/south-korea-proposes-screen-quotas-for-artfilms-1201727138.
209. Wiedemann, supra note 182, at 259.
210. Id. at 267.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
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Latin America: Assemble!

The Latin American region possesses certain features, such as
common language and cultural proximity, that make it fertile ground for
successful co-production agreements. Because “control of distribution is the
most important instrument of domination of media conglomerates,” a coproduction strategy would best address the pressing need of effective
distribution channels across Latin America.214 The region has garnered
success in the film sector through partnerships with Spain and Portugal, but
Latin American countries should continue to aggressively enter coproduction arrangements with other countries in the region in the various
sectors of the creative industries.
Several Latin American countries have co-production agreements in
the film sector, most notably via the Ibermedia fund, which supports
audiovisual operations in Spain, Portugal, and thirteen member nations in
Latin America.215 Ibermedia is primarily funded and located in Spain, and
requires participation by at least three member countries in each production
it funds.216 Ibermedia has been instrumental in guaranteeing Latin American
countries access to European markets which might otherwise be out of reach
due to financial or geographical barriers.217 Spain is the majority contributor
to Ibermedia, providing approximately 60% of the fund’s total capital.218
While Ibermedia provides Latin American countries access to the
European market, Spain’s large share of contribution and the need to appeal
to this market likely will lead to less-diverse media product offerings because
of the need to create global “tradable commodities.”219 Latin American
nations should create partnerships similar in structure to Ibermedia, relying
upon the strength of the potential Latin American market alone.
International co-production schemes have proven successful in the
film sector, but their application to other areas of the creative industries has
been limited. To address the problem identified in Part II above, in which
Latin American recording artists are “poached” by U.S. conglomerates after
gaining regional fame, Latin American countries should mirror the film coproduction scheme in their music recording sectors. While co-production
arrangements in the music industry would naturally look a bit different from
their film counterparts due to the lower number of inputs involved in curating
the finished product, the overall benefits could be similarly achieved. In a
214. Jaguaribe, supra note 166, at 315.
215. Tamara L. Falicov, Programa Ibermedia: Co-Production and the Cultural Politics
of Constructing an Ibero-American Audiovisual Space, HYBRID MEDIA, AMBIVALENT
FEELINGS 21, 21 (Hyung-Sook Lee ed., 2007); Steve Solot, The New International CoProduction Scenario, LATIN AMERICAN TRAINING CTR. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://latamtraining
center.com/?p=2685.
216. Solot, supra note 215.
217. Id.
218. Falicov, supra note 215, at 22.
219. Jaguaribe, supra note 166, at 313.
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music co-production scheme, a few countries could organize to provide the
publishing, production, and distribution of a sound recording. Under this
model, the creative control and copyright royalties would remain in Latin
American hands and pockets, effectively preserving the cultural expressions
embodied in the final recordings.
Under Weidemann’s policy framework, this strategy would promote
the creation of domestic creative industries in accordance with the standing
IP protections of TRIPS, while introducing more players into the local sectors
and thus achieving media pluralism. Additionally, an exclusively Latin
American co-production scheme would guarantee creators’ economic rights
by providing prolific opportunities to engage in projects throughout the entire
region. These economic rights would be bolstered by the standing IP regime
implemented through TRIPS. Accordingly, TRIPS would not stand as a
barrier to creative production, but rather act as a pillar of support for those
entities involved in the producing the large-scale projects which in turn
cultivate the vibrancy of local culture.
CONCLUSION
Co-production agreements that transcend territorial boundaries may
hold the key for Latin American countries seeking to preserve and cultivate
their domestic cultures through goods which reflect local preferences and
values. While TRIPS has heightened the cost of producing IP-based products
in Latin America, and thus rendered the region a net importer of cultural
goods, Latin American nations have the opportunity to aggressively engage
in international co-production arrangements to make their voices heard on
the domestic and global level. In doing so, Latin American nations can
preserve their local cultures while being globally competitive and, in turn,
come to rely on the strength of the TRIPS provisions to funnel royalties back
into Latin American economies.

